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he public’s ability to evaluate government 
programs is an essential part of the feedback 
process that links individual citizens to elected 
officials in the democratic process. Of major concern, 
however, is that the perceptual biases of individuals 
that are well documented in the behavioral public 
administration literature preclude objective 
evaluation (Belle, Cantarelli, & Belardinelli, 2018; 
James, Jilke, Petersen, & Walle, 2016; Marvel, 2015; 
Olsen, 2017). Among the findings in the literature are 
that there is a perceived bias against public 
organizations, that is, public organizations are 
evaluated more negatively than private organizations 
even when the objective outcomes are identical 
(Marvel, 2015; Hvidman & Andersen, 2016). Such 
findings are not without challenge. Meier, Johnson, 
& An (2019), replicating a Danish study (Hvidman & 
Andersen 2016) of hospitals that found bias, showed 
no sector bias in two replications in the US. 
Experimental subjects in the replication study rated 
US public hospitals no different from private 
hospitals. 
Differences in findings of the two studies can 
result from differences in context, differences in 
subjects, or differences in the structure of the 
experiments (Walker, James & Brewer, 2017). Given 
the similar design of both experiments and given the 
US study used two different subject pools (one 
MTurk adults and one students; the Danish study 
used students), differences in context are the likely 
explanation. Among the differences in delivery of 
public programs via hospitals in Denmark and the 
US is that the US hospital sector is dominated by 
nonprofit hospitals (62%); public hospitals total 20% 
and for-profit hospitals 18%. In Denmark, 97% of 
hospital beds are publicly owned. To keep the 
replication of Hvidman and Andersen as parallel as 
possible, Meier et al. (2019) only reported on the 
public versus private differences in the US setting. 
Studies examining sector bias in public 
programs need to include nonprofit organizations 
for both empirical and theoretical reasons. In the 
United States as well as in many developing countries, 
public programs are often implemented by nonprofit 
organizations rather than by government agencies or 
private sector organizations. In addition to hospital 
care, nonprofits play a major role in implementing 
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programs in education (charter schools and private 
universities), substance abuse treatment, mental 
health services, housing, and family planning, among 
others. Omitting such organizations could lead to 
misleading results. Theoretically, nonprofit 
organizations rely heavily on normative incentives 
and altruistic motivation (Donahue & Zechhauser 
2012), and this orientation might create positive halo 
effects that favor nonprofit programs over those 
delivered by government agencies. This might be 
especially the case in assessing performance criteria 
such as benevolence. 
This study contributes to the literature in terms 
of empirical generalization and extension by 
replicating Hvidman & Andersen (2016); in other 
words, we report a nonprofit organization cue that 
was included in the Meier et al. (2019) study. Our 
results, which are based on all three sectors (public, 
private, and nonprofit), reveal no differences in 
evaluations based on the sector of the hospital. 
Given that the results also show no differences 
across the three sectors, the difference in results 
between the US and Denmark studies cannot be 
attributed to the sector differences in implementing 
health policy and is likely to come from other 
contextual factors that differentiate the two countries.  
 
The Experiment 
 
Hvidman & Andersen (2016) presented a basic 2×2 
factorial design using university undergraduates. The 
subjects were exposed to vignettes about a hospital 
that was designated as either public or private; a 
second experimental manipulation randomly 
provided half the respondents with a performance 
evaluation cue, that is, the hospital contracted with 
an outside consultant to evaluate the hospital and this 
evaluation produced positive results. Our US 
replication was a 3×2 design with respondents 
randomly assigned to the hospital being public, 
private, or nonprofit and then randomly assigned to 
the same performance evaluation cue.1 Two 
replications were co- 
Table 1 
Balance across Experimental Groups 
 
Adult Sample Ideology Age 
Religious Service 
Attendance Gender White 
Public 
Baseline 2.50 37.38 1.95 0.48 0.75 
PM 2.78 35.97 2.01 0.53 0.67 
Private 
Baseline 2.46 35.15 1.88 0.53 0.77 
PM 2.38 35.87 1.89 0.52 0.77 
Nonprofit 
Baseline 2.58 36.55 1.92 0.62 0.80 
PM 2.68 36.13 1.97 0.51 0.75 
  Prob. > F 0.19 0.91 0.97 0.59 0.46 
Student Sample Ideology Age 
Religious Service 
Attendance Gender White 
Public 
Baseline 3.37 19.05 1.95 0.45 0.58 
PM 3.10 18.92 1.90 0.35 0.59 
Private 
Baseline 3.38 19.18 1.98 0.41 0.72 
PM 3.28 19.04 1.85 0.52 0.73 
Nonprofit 
Baseline 3.30 18.82 1.97 0.44 0.71 
PM 3.12 18.94 1.99 0.43 0.63 
  Prob. > F 0.14 0.24 0.93 0.32 0.06 
Note: PM indicates the performance management cue group; ideology is on a five-point scale from 1 (very liberal) to 
5 (very conservative); religious service attendance is on a four-point scale from 1 (never) to 4 (weekly); for gender 
and White, 1 indicates female and white, respectively (otherwise, zero); age is a continuous variable. 
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Table 2 
Factor Analysis of the Four Perceived Performance Dimensions 
 
Survey Item (Adult Sample) Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
The hospital is effective. 0.78 0.03 0.02 0.26 
The hospital is effective in accomplishing its 
core mission. 0.84 0.00 0.03 0.23 
The hospital is effective in delivering a very 
good service. 0.80 0.02 0.05 0.25 
The hospital has disproportionate 
administrative rules and procedures. -0.01 0.66 -0.02 0.13 
A high level of administrative procedures 
negatively affects the hospital's efficiency. 0.06 0.68 -0.04 0.19 
The hospital is effective in lowering its costs. 0.30 -0.06 0.33 0.10 
The hospital prioritizes its profit margin. 0.12 -0.25 0.32 -0.16 
The hospital is genuinely interested in the 
well-being of patients. 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.85 
The hospital acts in the interest of patients. 0.30 0.09 -0.01 0.85 
Cronbach's alpha 0.90 0.73 0.35 0.92 
Mean 0 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 0.91 0.76 0.43 0.90 
N 554 554 554 554 
Survey Item (Student Sample) Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
The hospital is effective 0.69 -0.14 0.00 0.25 
The hospital is effective in accomplishing its 
core mission. 0.72 -0.07 -0.04 0.25 
The hospital is effective in delivering a very 
good service. 0.68 -0.07 0.00 0.28 
The hospital has disproportionate 
administrative rules and procedures. -0.14 0.53 0.12 -0.16 
A high level of administrative procedures 
negatively affects the hospital's efficiency. -0.22 0.53 0.06 -0.15 
The hospital is effective in lowering its costs. -0.01 0.09 0.43 -0.04 
The hospital prioritizes its profit margin. -0.03 0.20 0.43 -0.12 
The hospital is genuinely interested in the 
well-being of patients. 0.24 -0.06 -0.04 0.78 
The hospital acts in the interest of patients. 0.25 -0.10 -0.03 0.78 
Cronbach's alpha 0.82 0.62 0.46 0.86 
Mean 0 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 0.83 0.64 0.54 0.84 
N 638 638 638 638 
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nducted.2 The first replication used 554 adult subjects 
selected from Amazon MTurk; the second 
replication used 638 undergraduate students from a 
large public university.3 The full documentation of 
the experiment can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Findings 
 
Tables 1 to 4 include the results from the two 
randomized survey experiments using both adult and 
student samples; each table presents the results of 
adult and student sample above and below, 
respectively.  
Table 1 reports the balance tests for the two 
experiments comparing the experimental and control 
groups on ideology, age, religious service attendance, 
gender, and race. None of the F-tests for imbalance 
are statistically significant, indicating that the 
randomization was effective. Table 2 shows the 
factor analyses for the dependent variables – 
effectiveness, red tape, efficiency, and benevolence 
for each of the sample pools. The factor analyses are 
slightly different from those appearing in Meier et al. 
(2019) owing to the larger sample size that results 
from including the subjects with the nonprofit 
treatment. The new samples, however, produce 
factor results that are very close to the original set, 
including the problematic 0.35 Cronbach’s alpha for 
the efficiency measure. Both the balance test and the 
factor analysis results indicate that the nonprofit 
group should be comparable to the public sector and 
private sector set of respondents. 
Table 3 
Perceptions of Performance:  
Impact of Sector and Performance Management, Regression Models (OLS) 
 
Adult Sample Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
Private Organizations (Private=1) -0.051 0.043 -0.024 -0.016 
 (0.095) (0.078) (0.047) (0.097) 
Public Organizations (Public=1) -0.058 0.104 -0.055 0.082 
 (0.096) (0.078) (0.045) (0.095) 
Performance Management -0.008 0.014 -0.007 0.229* 
 (0.077) (0.065) (0.036) (0.076) 
Constant 0.042 -0.058 0.031 -0.137 
 (0.078) (0.062) (0.040) (0.080) 
R-Squared Overall 0.0008 0.0033 0.0029 0.0187 
N 554 554 554 554 
Student Sample Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
Private Organizations (Private=1) 0.033 0.000 0.046 -0.095 
 (0.078) (0.061) (0.051) (0.082) 
Public Organizations (Public=1) 0.004 -0.008 0.014 -0.113 
 (0.084) (0.062) (0.053) (0.081) 
Performance Management -0.101 0.002 -0.046 -0.053 
 (0.066) (0.051) (0.042) (0.067) 
Constant 0.037 0.001 0.002 0.093 
 (0.068) (0.050) (0.041) (0.068) 
R-Squared Overall 0.0041 0.0000 0.0033 0.0042 
N 638 638 638 638 
Note: * p<0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests of significance; nonprofit organizations are the 
reference group across models. 
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In the original US experiment, the basic evaluation of 
public hospitals was not statistically different from 
the respondents’ evaluations of private hospitals. 
Findings from Table 3 using the adult and student 
sample show consistent results. There are no 
statistically significant differences in the evaluation of 
the hospitals based on sector; nonprofit hospitals are 
not rated either better or worse than public and 
Table 4 
Perceptions of Performance:  
Moderating Impact of Performance Management, Regression Models (OLS) 
 
Adult Sample Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
Private Organizations (Private=1) -0.105 0.023 -0.078 -0.013 
 (0.126) (0.108) (0.061) (0.136) 
Public Organizations (Public=1) 0.052 0.050 -0.050 -0.010 
 (0.129) (0.110) (0.066) (0.134) 
Performance Management (PM) 0.035 -0.041 -0.042 0.161 
 (0.141) (0.108) (0.069) (0.145) 
Private × PM 0.102 0.044 0.109 0.001 
 (0.190) (0.156) (0.094) (0.195) 
Public × PM -0.218 0.111 -0.005 0.187 
 (0.193) (0.157) (0.090) (0.190) 
Constant 0.022 -0.033 0.047 -0.106 
 (0.095) (0.074) (0.051) (0.098) 
R-Squared Overall 0.0065 0.0042 0.0067 0.0212 
N 554 554 554 554 
Student Sample Effectiveness Red Tape Efficiency Benevolence 
Private Organizations (Private=1) 0.058 -0.064 0.022 -0.125 
 (0.110) (0.085) (0.069) (0.116) 
Public Organizations (Public=1) 0.094 -0.035 0.016 -0.106 
 (0.117) (0.087) (0.065) (0.110) 
Performance Management (PM) -0.031 -0.057 -0.060 -0.068 
 (0.113) (0.085) (0.074) (0.117) 
Private × PM -0.043 0.125 0.047 0.060 
 (0.156) (0.123) (0.102) (0.164) 
Public × PM -0.185 0.048 -0.009 -0.019 
 (0.168) (0.123) (0.106) (0.164) 
Constant -0.001 0.033 0.010 0.102 
 (0.085) (0.061) (0.047) (0.086) 
R-Squared Overall 0.0063 0.0018 0.0038 0.0046 
N 638 638 638 638 
Note: * p<0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests of significance; nonprofit organizations are the 
reference group across models. 
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private hospitals in terms of effectiveness, red tape, 
efficiency, or benevolence.  
Both experiments followed the lead of 
Hvidman & Andersen (2016) using an experimental 
manipulation of the hospitals’ use of performance 
information; the vignette stated that the hospital 
hired an outside consultant to assess the hospital’s 
performance and that assessment reported positive 
results (for more details, see Appendix). The 
hypothesis was that public hospitals would not get 
credit for good performance, but private hospitals 
would. The performance manipulation had no 
impact on the evaluation of the Danish hospitals 
whether public or private, and the US study showed 
similar insignificant results with the exception of a 
positive change in terms of benevolence in the adult 
sample (but not the student sample) before the 
experimental condition was assessed by sector. 
Table 3 reports the impact of the performance 
appraisal cue controlling for the sector of the hospital, 
and Table 4 interacts the performance appraisal cue 
by sector. With the exception of the benevolence 
impact (direct impact only) for the adult population 
(Table 3), none of the results are statistically different 
from zero; the direct impact of performance 
management on benevolence even disappears when 
introducing interaction terms (Table 4). The basic 
conclusion is that US hospitals get no credit for 
engaging in an external performance appraisal that 
shows positive results, and this lack of results is 
consistent across the public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors.  Overall the experiments found no sector 
biases in the US hospital sector, either as a direct 
effect or in interaction with a performance appraisal. 
Nonprofit hospitals were not different from either 
public or private hospitals. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our replication of a Danish sector bias study 
involving hospitals failed to show any sector biases; 
public, private, and nonprofit hospitals with similar 
performance were rated no different from each other 
in two samples of subjects. Given that generally the 
perception is that the US has a pro-private sector 
orientation, additional research is clearly merited. 
One possibility for the absence of perceived 
differences, in fact, might be that at least one 
observational study of US hospitals found that on 
average they did not differ in terms of a wide range 
of performance indicators that included both the 
criteria for good medical treatment, hospital 
readmission rates, mortality rates, and public 
evaluations of the hospitals (Cheon, Song, McCrea & 
Meier, 2019). The similar performance ratings across 
US hospitals might have diluted the sectoral biases of 
the public since the public organizations are not 
necessarily performing poorly compared to other 
types of organizations. In other words, the similar 
performance ratings of hospitals across sectors in the 
US may contribute to our null findings. Other 
possibilities that might reveal biases should be 
considered such as the lack of negative information 
(the only cue was the positive performance 
management cue), the credibility of the performance 
evaluation information (the current cues were not 
especially precise), or the inclusion of other 
evaluation criteria that are more salient to the general 
public. We encourage future scholars to examine the 
above mentioned possibilities, replicating and 
extending the sector bias experiment. 
 
Notes 
 
1. To bolster the effects of sector cue, we included 
an addition, who controls the hospital, to the 
original sector cue by Hvidman & Andersen 
(2016); for more details on the sector cues, see 
Appendix. Nonetheless, our findings show no 
significant results.  
2. The replication files are available at Havard 
Dataverse: 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KFIZJZ. 
3. About 43 percent students failed to pass our 
manipulation check (identifying the sector), 
which is 19 percent higher than Hvidman & 
Andersen (2016). Excluding the subjects who 
failed to correctly identify the sector cue, the 
results are largely the same. Since excluding 
subjects that failed to pass the manipulation 
check can potentially lead to bias in estimation 
(for more details see Aronow, Baron, & Pinson, 
2019), we report the results with full sample. 
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Appendix  
 
Vignette 
 
The exact wording of our vignette for both MTurk and student sample is as follows:  
 
Atlas Hospital, [sector cue], is controlled by [sector cue] and has 450 employees. The hospital is organized into three sections. The 
hospital’s top management function is performed by a management team consisting of a medical director, a chief nursing off icer, and 
a hospital director. Atlas Hospital’s central administrative department is responsible for documenting that the hospital meet s 
management’s demands for safe and effective treatment. This task involves a comprehensive system of policies and standa rds in all 
areas of the hospital. The hospital’s goal is to provide health care of the highest quality, taking into account the special needs of the 
individual patients. [performance cue] The hospital has hired a consulting firm to give an overall assessment of the organization. 
The consultants concluded that:  
 
“The hospital uses modern technological equipment for examination and treatment.” 
 
“The staff has a high level of professionalism and regularly participate in training activities around the world.” 
 
Performance cue 
 
The hospital has introduced a performance management process in which performance information is collected and then returned to 
managers, who use it to adjust the objectives. This process involves the hospital continuously collecting data on the quality of treatment 
and patient satisfaction, data that is then used for evaluations of the hospital’s effectiveness.  
 
Sector cue 
1) Public: A county hospital, Atlas County 
2) Private: A private company, Atlas Health Services, Inc. 
3) Nonprofit: A non-profit institution, Atlas Charities Group 
